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ABSTRACT 
This paper deals with detection of SYN flooding attacks which are the most common type of attacks in a Mobile 
Agent World. We propose a new framework for the detection of flooding attacks by integrating Divergence 
measures over Sketch data structure. The performance of the proposed framework is investigated in terms of 
detection probability and false alarm ratio. We focus on tuning the parameter of Divergence Measures to 
optimize the performance. We will evaluate the performance of the proposed divergence measure via the 
receiver operating characteristic. Our analysis results prove that our proposed algorithm outperforms the 
existing solutions. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The traditional technique used in most distributed applications including the Internet, is the client-server 
approach. This approach involves, a client which is normally a system that relies on the services located on a 
remote system that is referred to as a server. Servers are usually more powerful than clients and provides 
mechanisms for clients to access their resources [19]. Clients usually access the resources on servers by using 
message passing or remote procedure call. However, as the demand of these applications and the number of 
users who wish to do using wireless and portable devices increases significantly, it was realized that the 
traditional client-server approach was lacking in terms of bandwidth use and server flexibility, load balancing, 
availability. In order to solve the inadequacies of the client-server approach, a new paradigm is needed which is 
the use of mobile agents [33]. 
  
Mobile agents are software that can migrate from nodes to nodes in a computer network and perform a 
computation on the behalf of the user. It has a unique ability to transport itself from one system in a network to 
another. Mobile agent are considered autonomy, active, mobility, goal oriented and communicative [32]. As a 
result of these unique properties, mobile agent systems usually benefit from the following: reduction in network 
load, improvement in network latency, asynchronous execution, protocol encapsulation, dynamic adaptation, 
fault-tolerance and robustness. Mobile agents work in conjunction with a mobile agent platform which provides 
appropriate execution environment for the mobile agent. This platform needs to be available at each potential 
host willing to entertain a visiting mobile agent. In this thesis all the background information on the concept of 
mobile agent is given. 
 
Many Mobile Agent platforms have been developed during the last decade. The platforms have been 
programmed using different programming languages such as Java, TCl, C/C++ and other miscellaneous codes. 
Some of these platforms have been developed for commercial purposes and others for research [19]. In our 
research, we will use the Aglet platform to design our model and to test the real behavior of the Mobile Agent in 
the network area. 
 
However, one of the main technical concern of the mobile agent is security. Sander and Tschudin raised two 
types of security problems that need to be solved. The first is host protection against malicious agents. The 
second is agent protection against malicious hosts. Many techniques have been developed for the first problem, 
such as access control, password protections, sand boxes etc.  But the second problem appears to be difficult to 
solve. This paper will discuss how to detect the anomalies on a mobile agent network. 
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The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Related work is provided in Section 2. Section 3 provides the 
security issues that a Mobile Agent can counter while visiting another host in the network. We will discuss 
about Sketch data structure which it will provide grained analysis and to derive probability distributions and we 
will introduce a dynamic threshold to differentiate network anomalies from normal behavior in Section 4. 
Section 5 describes our proposed approach design. In Section 6, we present our experimental works and check 
the capability, reaction and performance of the mobile agents based on the developed design and will evaluate 
the performance of the measure divergence via the receiving operating characteristic (ROC). Finally in Section 
7, we present the conclusion and our future work. 
 
II. RELATED WORK 
From one side several researches have been proposed security solutions to detect and prevent attacks in real 
traffic. Most of these proposed solutions emphasize on many different detection and prevention strategies. 
 
SYN flooding attack detection has been an interested issue for security researchers. The authors in [2] present 
the effects of correlation analysis on the DDoS detection. They propose a covariance analysis method for 
detecting SYN flooding attacks. 
 
Authors in [7] compare two different algorithms (CUSUM and adaptive threshold) for the detection of SYN 
flooding attack. They conclude that CUSUM performs better then adaptive threshold in terms of detection 
accuracy of low intensity attacks. However, both of these algorithms face problems of false alarm ratio under 
normal IP traffic variation.  
 
Sketch data structure uses the random aggregation for more grained analysis than aggregating the whole traffic 
in one time series. It has been used to summarize monitored traffic in a fixed memory, and to provide scalable 
input for time series analysis. Authors in [8] propose the use of CUmulative SUM (CUSUM) over the sketch for 
network anomaly detection.  
 
Authors in [10] apply Chi-square on Sketch data structure, in order to detect divergence between current and 
previous distributions of the number of SIP INVITE request. In fact, Chi-square must be near zero when 
probability distributions are similar, and it increases up to one whenever the distributions diverges (e.g. under 
Invite flooding attacks). In addition, they used the dynamic threshold proposed in [11] during their experimental 
analysis. 
 
From other side, several researches have been conducted over mobile Agents. 
 
Some studies concentrate their work on the fault tolerance techniques in mobile agents, network management 
applications based on mobile agent technologies and how the fault tolerance techniques can improve their 
performance [25], [26]. 
 
In addition, some works have been performed to integrate the mobile agents with the e-commerce. Some 
technical relevant issues are well presented [28], [29], [30].   
 
Some researches concentrated their work on security concerns (i.e denial of service, alteration, masquerading ) 
of mobile agents and how to protect them by several techniques like obfuscated code, trusted hardware, mutual 
itinerary record, , path histories and State Appraisal [21], [22],[23],[24]. However, these techniques present 
several drawbacks like decrease the efficiency and performance of mobile agents, provide some complicated 
and large code that increase the latency of the network. 
 
Our research combines the mobile agents and the detection methods. It emphasizes on how a mobile agent can 
detect a flooding attacks. We develop a general framework that increases the detection accuracy and reduces the 
false alarm by integrating divergence measure over Sketch technique in a Mobile Agent world. 
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III. MOBILE AGENTS SECURITY THREATS AND COUNTERMEASURES 
Security is one of the key factors of MAS. In fact, a MA is one of the potential threats to computer systems and 
vice versa, from the host system to the MAS itself. In this part, we will talk about the main security issues 
related to MAS. 
 
The security threats for MASs could be divided as follows:  
 Eavesdropping: The classical eavesdropping threat involves the interception and monitoring of secret 
communications. The threat of eavesdropping, however, is further exacerbated in mobile agent systems 
because the agent platform can not only monitor communications, but also can monitor every 
instruction executed by the agent, all the data it brings to the platform, and all the subsequent data 
generated on the platform. Since the platform has access to the agent’s code, state, and data, the visiting 
agent must be wary of the fact that it may be exposing proprietary algorithms, trade secrets, negotiation 
strategies, or other sensitive information. Even though the agent may not be directly exposing secret 
information, the platform may be able to infer meaning 
 Alteration: The final form of attack by a host on an agent is the alteration of the agent. The host can 
alter an agent by changing the data, code and control flow. A malicious host may try to change the code 
of an agent so that the agent performs other tasks than were intended by its creator. A host may also try 
to change the data contained in the agent. 
 Denial of Services: A host may deny an agent a specific service provided by the host. It is possible for 
a host to both intentionally and unintentionally deny an agent a service. A host may deny an agent 
service so that the agent is not able to complete its task. Another possible attack is the host could 
terminate the agent altogether. Furthermore, a host may deny a request from an agent on a time-
sensitive task so that the agent is unable to complete its task in its allotted time. 
 SYN flood attack: it consist on sending many TCP connection requests to a target. This latter will 
accept the establishment of the connection and notify the client. Except that, this one will never use 
them. Thereby, the server will be drown by unused connections and, eventually, will not reply to 
legitimate users requests. 
 
There are many security services that can be used for securing the agents systems. 
 Authentication, the host needs to know the sender of the delivered agent. The agent authentication 
process includes verifying the entity that programmed the agent and also verifying the entity that 
forwarded it to the host. The agent and the host need to know with whom they are talking and dealing 
with, here the encryption or credentials can be used. 
 Integrity, checking the integrity of the agents is a technique that makes sure no one has made any 
changes to the agents, the agents travelling form on host to another, and communicates and exchanges 
their data with other hosts and other agents.  
 Authorization, the incoming agents should have a specific right to access the host information, so 
different agents have different authority, to protect the hosts and also to protect themselves. 
 
For simplicity, we are going in this article to focus on the SYN flooding attacks and see how the mobile agents 
will act against these anomalies. 
 
IV. BACKGROUND  
Sketch technique 
In this section, we review the K-ary Sketch data structure. Using Sketch data structure makes our framework 
flexible and scalable for grained analysis. No matter how many flows exist in the traffic, Sketch generates fixed-
number of time series [3], [4] for anomaly detection. Sketch provides more grained analysis than aggregating 
whole traffic in one time series. 
 
The Sketch data structure is used for dimensionality reduction. It is based on random aggregation of traffic 
attribute (e.g. number of packets) in different hash tables. A Sketch S is a 2D array of H × K cell (see Fig.1), 
where K is the size of the hash table, and H is the number of mutual independent hash functions (universal hash 
functions). Each item is identified by a key κn and associated with a reward value νn. For each new arriving 
item (κn, νn), the associated value will be added to the cell S[i][j], where i is an index used to represent the hash 
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function associated with ith hash table (0 ≤ i ≤ d − 1), and j is the hash value (j = hi(κn)) of the key by the ith 
hash function. 
 
Data items, whose keys are hashed to the same value, will be aggregated in the same cell in the hash table, and 
their values will be added up to existing counter in the hash table. Each hash table (or each row) is used to 
derive probability distribution as the ratio of the counter in each cell to the sum of whole cell in the line. The 
derived probability distributions (we get K probability set, one per line) are used as inputs for divergence 
measures 
 
 
Fig. 1. Sketch Data structure 
 
Threshold  
In order to differentiate network anomalies from normal behavior on the mobile agent, the use of a detection 
threshold for Power Divergence (PD) is mandatory. Instead of using a static threshold, we use a dynamic one: 
Jacobson Fast algorithm for RTT (Round - Trip Time) mean and variation [15], [18]. Let PD(n) be the current 
value of the Power Divergence. PD(n) and PD(n+1) are respectively the current and next exponentially 
smoothed average estimates of Power Divergence. Let ơ(n) be the deviation between the current Power measure 
PD(n) and the average measure ̅PD(n). The exponentially smoothed average of ơ(n) is denoted by ơ̅ (n). The 
estimated threshold h(n+1) is then given as follows: 
ˉPD(n + 1) = ( 1 − α)   𝑥   ˉPD(n) +  α  x  PD(n)           (1) 
α(n) = | ˉPD(n) − 𝑃𝐷(𝑛)                                                       (2) 
ˉơ(n + 1) = (1 − α) 𝑥  ˉơ(n) +  α  x    ơ(n)                       (3) 
h(n + 1) = λ x  ˉPD(n + 1) +  μ  x    ˉơ(n + 1)                 (4) 
 
Where α, λ and μ are all tunable parameters that can be adjusted numerically in order to improve the detection 
accuracy. 
 
V. PROPOSED APPROACH  
The approach used in this paper to detect the DDoS attacks is based on probabilistic decision measure. In fact, 
the idea is to estimate the subjective prior distribution of the mobile agent traffic and to use it as a baseline 
probability. This probability distribution is denoted by q = [q1……. qw]. In presence of attacks over the mobile 
agent network, the probability distribution changes. One can use this change to detect the attacks. However, 
with the traffic variations, this probability distribution changes also even in the absence of attacks. This is called 
false alarms/attacks. The objective then is to find a method that detects the attacks and remove the false alarms. 
This motivates the need for a quantitative measure of information or more generally a decision theoretic 
measure of divergence between the basic probability q and some other distribution p. Power Divergences are 
generalizations of this decision measure and are associated with strictly convex functions. 
 
The Power Divergence has been first defined in [7] and equivalent variants (up to a scale factor𝛽) of this 
divergence are discussed in [35]. The divergence measure is therefore the decision measure that generalizes the 
Kullback-Leibler measure and Hellinger distance to a broad class of divergence of order𝛽. In fact, the Power  
 
Divergence is a measure of distance between two probability measures of order 𝛽 given as follows: 
𝑃𝐷 (𝑃||𝑄) = 
∑ 𝑃𝑖𝑤𝑖=1  (𝑃𝑖/𝑄𝑖)
𝛽−1−1
𝛽 (𝛽−1)
           (5) 
 
Where P is the posterior probability distribution and Q is the prior probability distribution. This divergence 
presents some interesting special cases. For 𝛽 = 0.5, this divergence is 4 x HD (P || Q) [36], and for 𝛽 = 2 it is 
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equal to         0.5 x χ2 (P || Q) divergence. Obviously, this power divergence outperforms then the existing 
solutions: HD and χ2 (some results will be provided later in the paper). 
 
In fact, by changing the values of 𝛽, one can optimize the detection of attacks compared to Chi-Square and HD. 
In our experiments described later, we will show numerically that for different values of 𝛽, the detection 
efficiency changes. The optimal value of 𝛽 can then be obtained. 
 
P and Q are derived from the Sketch data structure in two consecutive discrete intervals. Firstly, the shared 
counters of the sketch are continuously updated from ongoing traffic during a time interval T. At the end of each 
interval, the probability Pi,j is calculated as the ratio of each counter to the sum of the whole counters in one 
hash table: 
 
Pi, j =  
S [i][j]
∑ S [i][j]wj=1
            (6) 
 
We obtain d probability distributions in each interval (P1 ……Pd), where Pi is the distribution (P1 ….Pd) 
resulted from the 𝑖𝑡ℎ hash table. Qi is the probability distributions resulted from previous interval. The 
probability distributions of Qi is calculated in the same manner as Pi (Eq. 5). 
 
When the Power Divergence is larger than dynamically updated threshold, we raise an alarm. However, Power 
Divergence induces only two spikes (at the start and at the end of attack). As we want to continuously raise 
alarms for whole duration of the attack, the distribution Qi will stop sliding by keeping its value until the end of 
the attack. However, with the variations of normal traffic, and the similarity of DDoS attacks with flash crowd, 
we suppose that flooding attacks will span for many intervals, in contrast to flash crowd and normal variation. 
Thus reduce the false alarms. Therefore, we will trigger an alarm only if the deviation lasts more than Δ 
intervals. 
 
VI. EXPERIMENTAL WORKS 
In this section, we present the performance analysis results for integrating divergence measures over Sketch, for 
detecting SYN flooding attacks in a mobile agent network. 
 
For the sake of simplicity, we focus our analysis on the detection of TCP SYN flooding attacks, as it is the 
widely used attack for DDoS in these days. 
 
Dataset 
The following techniques and tools are used: Two workstations with 8 GB and 768 MB of RAM respectively, 
which run Windows Server 2003 and a number of Mobile Agents are used.  
 
We have considered the above describe mobile agents will have to execute the similar path. To measure the 
capability of the proposal towards eavesdropping threat, a test environment is set up using the above mentioned 
computers (see Fig. 2). Computer A is considered to act as trusted server (TS) and computer B runs many host 
nodes simulated through various port numbers as well as the home node in a virtualized mode. Ethereal will be 
running regularly over computer A. its job is to collect packets in the mobile agent network and store them for a 
period of 4h00 from 18/03/2017 08h30 to 12h30. These traces are used to test the efficiency of divergence 
measures. IP addresses in the traces are scrambled by a modified version of tcpdriv tool, but correlation between 
addresses are conserved. We analyze these 8h30 traces using Sketch data structure, with a key of the Sketch (κn 
= DIP), and a reward vn = 1 for SYN request only, and vn = 0 otherwise. We set the Sketch width K to 1024, 
and the number of hash H to 5. 
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Fig. 2.  Experimental Lab 
 
Afterward, we inject 12 real distributed SYN flooding attacks with different intensity inside this trace. These 
attacks are inserted each 30 minutes (on instants t=20, 50, 80, 115,145,170, etc.) and span for 10 minutes. These 
different intensity attacks are shown in Figure 4. The first attack begins with a value of 900 SYN/min and 
decreases until 280 SYN/min. 
 
 
Fig. 3.  SYN flooding Attacks 
 
Fig. 4 & Fig. 5 show the variation of total number of mobile agents’ packets before and after the injection of 
SYN flooding attacks. By comparing these variations, we might not notice the differences between both figures 
without deep inspection. Inserted attacks don’t induce heavy deviations in the time series of the total number of 
SYN requests. This can be explained by the fact that the intensity of SYN flooding attacks is not large compared 
to the intensity of the total number of SYN segments. In such cases, the detection of attacks is very challenging, 
because no heavy changes in the time series describing the variations of the total number of SYN, and the 
intensity of the SYN flooding attacks  is buried by the large number of SYN (see Fig. 3) before attacks injection. 
 
Evaluation Strategy 
In this section, we present the evaluation results of the application of these divergence measures on the mobile 
agent IP traces. 
 
 
 Fig. 4.  Total number of mobile agents’ packets 
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Fig. 5. Total number of mobile agents’ packets after SYN  flooding attacks injection 
 
 
We will focus our study on the Power Divergence. Due to space limitation, we provide in this section, the 
results for only two values of  𝛽 = 0.5 and 2. 
 
The value of 𝛽 = 0.5 makes the Power Divergence (PD) proportional to Hellinger Distance (HD). 
 
Fig. 6 shows the variation of Power Divergence for 𝛽 = 0.5 with the dynamic threshold given in Equation 5. 
Power Divergence is able to detect all the SYN flooding attacks but with 4 false alarms. 
 
For the value of 𝛽= 2, Fig. 7 shows the variation of Power. We can notice that via this value of 𝛽, all the attacks 
have been detected (100%) with only 1 false alarm.  
 
The intensity of spike is proportional to the intensity of the attack.  
 
We conclude that the value of 𝛽= 2 outperforms 𝛽 = 0.5 in terms of true detection and false alarm rate. 
 
 
 
Fig. 6. Power Divergence for 𝜷=0.5         
                                 
 
Fig. 7. Power Divergence for 𝜷= 2 
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Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) 
To evaluate the performance of Power Divergence with different value of 𝛽, we investigate the detection rate 
and the false alarm rate. Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) is used for accuracy analysis when varying 
the value of the threshold h. ROC curve shows the variation of the true positive (Eq. 7) in term of false alarm 
rate (Eq. 8): 
𝐷𝑅 =
TP
TP + FN
𝑋 100             (7) 
 
Where TP is the number of true positive alerts, and FN is the number of false negative. The false alarm rate is 
defined as the ratio of false alarms to the number of raised alarms: 
 
𝐹𝐴𝑅 =
TP
TP + FP
 𝑋  100             (8)    
 
For 𝛽 = 0.5, ROC curve is presented in Fig. 8, where PD can achieve a detection rate of 100% with 43% of false 
alarm. 
The ROC for 𝛽 = 2 is presented in Fig. 9, where PD achieves a detection rate of 100% with 10% of false alarm. 
The comparison between the two curves shows that PD accuracy increases when increasing the value of 𝛽. 
 
 
Fig. 8. ROC for Power Divergence for 𝜷= 0.5          
                         
 
Fig. 9. ROC for Power Divergence for 𝜷= 2 
 
VII. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, we proposed a new framework based on Sketch and Divergence Measures for anomaly detection 
on a mobile agents network. The proposed approach evaluated on real traces with DDoS SYN flooding attacks. 
We compared the performances in terms of true positive and false alarm ratio, over real mobile agents IP traces 
with injected real distributed SYN flooding attacks at known instants. 
 
We showed that, in a mobile agents network, Power Divergence presents some interesting special cases. For 𝛽 = 
0.5, this divergence is 4 x HD (P || Q) and for 𝛽 = 2 it is equal to 0.5 x  𝜒2 (P || Q) divergence. Obviously, this 
power divergence outperforms then the existing divergence measures (Chi square & Hellinger Distance) 
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measures. In fact, by changing the values of 𝛽, one can optimize the detection of attacks compared to the 
existing divergence measures.   
We also evaluated the performance of the PD via the detection rate and the false alarm rate. We noticed that PD 
accuracy increases when increasing the value of 𝛽. 
 
In our future work, we will focus on providing additional information to pinpoint malicious flows, in order to 
trigger automatic reaction against ongoing attacks over the mobile agents. 
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